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1 Introduction
Milton Friedman stated that, “when technical conditions make a monopoly the natural outcome
of competitive market forces, there are only three alternatives that seem available: private
monopoly, public monopoly, or public regulation. All three are bad so we must choose among
evils” (Friedman 1962, 28). This paper presents comparative statics of a fourth, arguably
also imperfect, organizational mode of natural monopolies in the utilities sector: public-private
partnerships (PPPs).
According to the World Bank (2017), a public-private partnership is “a long-term contract
between a private party and a government entity, for providing a public asset or service, in
which the private party bears significant risk and management responsibility, and remuneration
is linked to performance.” When are PPPs a welfare superior organizational mode compared
to private monopoly, public monopoly, and public regulation for the provision of public goods?
Standard microeconomics (Varian 1992; Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995) focuses
on the effective provision of public goods and conditions for Pareto optimality. The indus-
trial organization and regulation literature (Tirole 1988; Newbery 2000; Viscusi, Vernon, and
Harrington 2000; Armstrong and Sappington 2006) does not venture beyond the classic, al-
beit limited trichotomy of private, public, and regulated monopolies. In most cases, PPPs are
analyzed in categories of “best practices” (Osborne and Gaebler 1993; Vaillancourt-Rosenau
2000) without formal modeling.
There are notable works of economic modeling of PPP. For example, Grout (1997, 2005)
and Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic (2013) emphasize the efficiency gains from bundling in-
frastructure development and operations; Hart (2003) focuses on contract incompleteness and
residual control rights; and Iossa and Martimort (2012) model mechanism design to auction
projects, incentivize private investments, and avoid costly renegotiations. In these papers,
however, ownership and management are modeled as either private or public.
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) view ownership as residual control
rights which matter only if contracts are incomplete. Twisting the central question of the
Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights framework: “If privatization or concession contracts
cannot fully specify the usage of the utility in every state of the world, then who gets the right
to choose?” Subsequently, what are the benefits and costs of transferring (partial) ownership
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of the utility from the public sector to private investors, and what is the optimal public-private
ownership structure?
In contrast to the extant literature, I analyze on the impact of mixed public-private own-
ership on operating efficiency and welfare. I model specific drivers of PPP efficiency—namely,
regulation cost and managerial expertise—as functions of private ownership. Regulation and
managerial expertise capture the major differentials and trade-offs involved between public and
private sectors in pursue of their goals: welfare and profit. Should regulation be costless, there
would be no need for public provision, as the public administration would outsource the provi-
sion of public goods and force private providers to supply welfare efficient outcomes. Likewise,
if there were no managerial expertise differential between the public and private sectors, there
would be no need for private provision, as the public administration would have access to the
best technology and know-how. In particular institutional settings, the relevance of regulation
cost and managerial expertise is subdued to political constraints; in general, however, they do
matter and hence should be factored in.
Out of the nine combinations of public, mixed public-private, and private ownership and
public, mixed public-private, and private management, seven—i.e., all but public provision of
public goods (in-house) and full privatization—have been regarded in different literatures as
public-private partnerships.
Hereafter, I center my analysis on institutional PPP—also referred as “equity public-
private joint ventures”—where the public agent and private investor co-share ownership and
management. The thrust of this paper is that institutional PPP encapsulates all major trade-
offs of public-private relations, rendering alternative public-private schemes as particular cases.
Comparative statics of institutional PPP will, therefore, shed light on the whole spectrum of
public-private arrangements.
There are a number of idiosyncratic characteristics of institutional PPPs that make them
interesting from the perspective of organizational economics and policy:
(a) Institutional PPPs reduce information asymmetries between investors and public admin-
istrations regarding output quantity, actual investment, and operating cost. In strategic
alliances, joint ventures create the best supervisory mechanism, and stimulate revealing
information, sharing technologies, and ensuring good practices (Kogut 1988, p. 321);
3
(b) Institutional PPPs offset transaction costs concerning ex ante negotiation and regulation,
and ex post possible renegotiation of quality and price between the private investor and
the public administration (Armstrong and Sappington 2006);
(c) Institutional PPPs enable the internalization of private technology and specific know-how
that lead to operating cost reduction (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997; Iossa and Martimort
2015; Kwak, Chih, and Ibbs 2009) and quality improvement without complex monitoring
systems (McDonald 1999; Va¨lila¨ 2005);
(d) Institutional PPPs limit the social perception of private-sector opportunism thanks to
direct formal and informal audits (Balakrishnan and Koza 1993); and
(e) Compared to private or regulated monopolies, institutional PPPs are associated with a
higher social consent to public aid through guarantees, preferential loans, and direct sub-
sidies (Trujillo, Cohen, Freixas, and Sheehy 1998).
Mixed public-private ownership utilities are quite common in Europe. According to the
World Bank, ca. one fourth of infrastructure projects in Europe and Central Asia display
private ownership between 20 and 80% (World Bank 2016). For example, major European
airport hubs, including Charles de Gaulle in Paris, Hamburg, and Frankfurt, are co-owned by
private investors and public administrations; in Poland, out of 466 steam heating producers
which serve over 50% of the population, 51% are public, 19% are private, 13% are public-private
with public majority, and 17% are public-private with private majority.
Moreover, institutional PPPs were recently revamped by the UK government’s “New [Pri-
vate Finance] PF2” (HM Treasury 2013). The rationale provided in support of the agenda was
that “as a shareholder, the public sector will have a seat on the board, giving it a stronger
voice on the decisions concerning management of the project companies, marking an important
step towards increased transparency and better partnership relationships between the public
and private sectors” (HM Treasury 2013). This rationale surfaces the relevance of residual
control rights (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990) for the management of PPPs
and the alleviation of information asymmetries between the public administrations and private
investors.
On the other hand, institutional PPPs are alien to the American market. Typical design-
build-finance-operate-maintain (DBFOM) PPPs in US highways—e.g., the Dulles Greenway
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in the DC metro area or 91 Express Lanes in California—would fall outside of this category,
since there is no public-sector equity involved.
What explains, thence, the utilization of institutional PPPs in some jurisdictions and less
so in other places? I analyze the economic and institutional constraints under which utilities
co-owned and co-managed by public administrations and private investors are welfare superior
to other organizational forms of provision of public goods. The upshot is that equity co-
ownership—which allows for direct oversight and management (Williamson 1988)—can be an
efficient governance structure for public utilities where know-how savings and regulation costs
are significant.
The paper unfolds as follows: In section 2, I set up the framework of analysis as a partial
equilibrium welfare economy. In section 3, model institutional public-private partnerships:
their objective functions of public and private agents, governance structure, and payoffs as
functions of ownership and control. In section 4, I provide comparative statics of public-
private partnership vis-a`-vis other organizational forms of utilities. In section 5, I analyze the
policy implications derived from the model, including testable predictions. In section 6, I relax
some assumptions to accommodate extensions and special cases of public-private economics.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Model Setup
I utilize a partial equilibrium setup with a representative consumer and a good x produced by
a natural monopoly.1 The consumer maximizes utility under budget constraints. Consumer
utility is a function of quantity of good x, and quantity of the other goods produced on the
competitive market. The private investor maximizes profit pi. The public agent (benevolent
planner) maximizes welfare given by joint consumer and producer surpluses. Quality is cor-
related with the technical infrastructure and implemented technology—i.e., the development
phase. Entering (or contesting) the natural monopoly requires sizable investments in specific
non-redeployable assets (i.e., “sunk costs”). These costs are shown in cost accounting as fixed
costs: financial costs and depreciation. To focus on quantity output, in this paper all invest-
ment costs are sunk costs spread over time as fixed costs (Tirole 1988), and quality level is
1 See the Appendix A for a glossary.
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constant and given by the planner in laws and regulation standards (Moszoro 2016).
A pricing tariff is set in two parts: a fixed part covering fixed cost F (as a function of
investment in the technical infrastructure and implemented technology) and a variable part
p(x) which depends on actual consumption. I assume that the infrastructure is already built
either by the public or private sector at the same development cost, the fixed cost (or lump
sum) is covered by the fixed fee, and further analyze the variable component of the two-part
tariff. The aim of this gimmick is to distill the drivers of efficiency differentials in public-private
arrangements at the operating stage.
I also assume that average variable cost AV C = c(x)/x reaches its minimum at a relatively
low quantity output x. Average total cost ATC = TC(x)/x = [F + c(x)]/x decreases in
the region of its intersection with the demand curve, which is a sufficient condition for the
occurrence of a natural monopoly in a one-product company. A fixed fee equal to fixed cost and
price equal to marginal cost guarantees profit in increasing economies of scale and increasing
marginal cost (Coase 1946).2
Let p(x) be the inverse demand function after covering the fixed fee, differentiable, and
non-increasing (p′(x) ≤ 0). The utility company sets price p and provides quantity demand
x. Optimal quantity output x∗ will, therefore, occur at the level at which p(x∗) = MC(x∗)
(Coase 1946; Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995). At x∗ consumer surplus equals:
CS∗ =
∫ x∗
0
p(x) dx− p(x∗) · x∗ (1)
and producer surplus equals:
PS∗ = p(x∗) · x∗ −
∫ x∗
0
MC(x) dx (2)
with profit equal to:
pi∗ = p(x∗) · x∗ − c(x∗) (3)
This set of output x∗ and price p∗ is the first-best benchmark for further comparative statics.
Because quality output (and the investment expenses related to it) affects welfare, by fixing
quality output and the fee that covers the investment cost this analysis presents comparative
2 If an industry shows decreasing marginal cost (∀xMC < AV C), the pricing policy should be changed to
average cost pricing. Such a pricing policy, however, would not be optimal from a welfare perspective (Viscusi,
Vernon, and Harrington 2000, 347–348).
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welfare differentials yielded by marginal cost pricing and quantity outputs under different
organizational arrangements.3
I limit my analysis to single-product natural monopolies.4 These monopolies often produce
necessity goods, indispensable for living at minimum accepted standards. Water and sewage,
electricity transmission, trackbeds, and bridges undoubtedly fall into this category. The basic
and elementary character of these goods and egalitarian access to them support the argument
for keeping them public or subject to regulation.
3 Modelling Institutional Public-Private Joint Ventures
In this section, I model regulation cost and managerial expertise as functions of private own-
ership in joint venture (institutional) PPPs. From a model standpoint, institutional PPPs
contain all possible public-private trade-offs and give the gist of other combinations of hybrid
public-private ownership and management as extensions of the base model.5
3.1 Objective Functions
Let θ ∈ (0, 1) be the private and 1− θ be the public share in profit of the joint-venture public-
private monopoly.6 There is no integrative objective function of the institutional PPP, but two
interrelated target functions. On the one hand, depending on the competitive environment,
investors maximize turnover (sales), market share, or return on investment; ultimately, they
maximize profit. For simplicity, hereinafter the private investor maximizes profit given by θpijv.
On the other hand, the benevolent public administration maximizes welfare W given by
the sum of consumer and weighted producer surplus:
max
x,θ
W =
∫ xjv
0
p(x) dx−
∫ xjv
0
MC(x) dx− (1− α)θ [p(xjv) · xjv − c(xjv)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit share not in welfare
(4)
subject to xjv ≥ 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1). The parameter α ∈ (0, 1) is a calibration parameter
that weights profit in welfare. Profit is a wealth transfer from the consumer to the producer.
3 In section 6.4, I analyze the case of feasible quantity–quality trade-offs.
4 For an analysis of regulation and liberalization in industries susceptible to competition—
telecommunications, natural gas provision, and electricity generation and retail sales—see, e.g., Armstrong
and Sappington (2006).
5 In section 6.5, I analyze to remaining combinations of hybrid public-private ownership and management.
6 Note that θ = 0 corresponds to public monopoly and θ = 1 to private and regulated monopoly.
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Therefore, if the public administration weights more consumer surplus than producer surplus,
α will be lower than one. Likewise, if the private investor expatriates profit, it will not be part
of the total welfare of the constituency the company serves, rendering α below one. θ and α
are negatively correlated, reasonably assuming that α = 1 if and only if θ = 0.7
The Lagrangian Z of equation (4) can be formulated as:
Z =
∫ xjv
0
p(x) dx−
∫ xjv
0
MC(x) dx− (1− α)θ [p(xjv) · xjv − c(xjv)] + λθ (5)
with Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
∂Z
∂x
≤ 0, xjv ≥ 0, and xjv
∂Z
∂x
= 0
∂Z
∂θ
≤ 0, θ ≥ 0, and θ
∂Z
∂θ
= 0, and
θ ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, and λθ = 0
(6)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Differentiating Z with respect to x and θ yields:
∂Z
∂x
= p(xjv)−MC(xjv)− (1− α)θ
[
∂p(x)
∂x
· xjv + p(xjv)−MC(xjv)
]
(7)
∂Z
∂θ
= −(1− α)[p(xjv) · xjv − c(xjv)] + λ (8)
For any output xjv > 0, optimization requires ∂Z/∂x = 0, i.e.:
p(xjv)−MC(xjv) = (1− α)θ
[
∂p(x)
∂x
· xjv + p(xjv)−MC(xjv)
]
(9)
If θ = 0 and α = 1 (public monopoly), market clearance is realized at a higher price
p(xpu) =MC(xpu) + k. For α, θ ∈ (0, 1), in equilibrium:
∂p(x)
∂x
=
[1− (1− α)θ] · [p(xjv)−MC(xjv)]
(1− α)θ · xjv
(10)
As the price falls in quantity (∂p(x)/∂x < 0), the welfare maximizing public agent would set
p(xjv) = AV C(xjv) < MC(xjv), which means incremental expropriation (loss).
From maximization conditions regarding θ:
λ = (1− α)[p(xjv) · xjv − c(xjv)] (11)
where λ is the dual price of increasing welfare in relation to the private share constraint (θ ≤ 1),
it follows that if profit equals zero, sufficient Kuhn-Tucker conditions are met for every θ > 0.
7 In particularly, if there are transfers to the external sector, α < 1 applies.
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The private investor maximizes profit:
max
x,θ
pi = θ[p(xjv) · xjv − c(xjv)] (12)
subject to xjv ≥ 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1). As θ is a linear multiplier, profit maximization results
directly from the F.O.C. of function (12): ∂pi/∂x = 0. Therefore, the private investor will aim
to maximize θ, which follows from investors–public administrators negotiations (i.e., it is not
endogenous to the model).
3.2 Structure and Governance
The aim of regulation is to draw the private monopoly close to the first-best benchmark utility
company described in equations (2) and (3) by setting the price close to marginal cost. The
producer knows its cost and quality output, but the regulator does not. The regulator bears the
costs of overcoming information asymmetry regarding operations, cash flows, cost of capital,
and compliance with quality standards (Newbery 2000; Armstrong and Sappington 2006).8
Suppose arguendo, that the regulator in order to assess the marginal cost has to incur cost
g for each unit of output. This regulation cost is next passed to the consumer (e.g., through
higher taxation or higher price).
Let’s assume that in a PPP, the public agent requires a minimum ownership and profit
share h to exercise internal regulation, so that:
MCjv(x) =
{
MC(x) + g if 1− θ < h (information asymmetry)
MC(x) if 1− θ ≥ h (internal regulation)
(13)
On the other hand, the average variable cost—dependent on technology, administrative
procedures, and management skills; hereinafter referred in short as “know-how”—of the public
monopoly is higher than the average variable cost of the first-best benchmark utility company.
Due to the lack of know-how, public monopoly’s production of each unit of x is more costly by
k than that of private monopoly.9 The variable k, therefore, corresponds to the agent’s (public
8 The use of bids to select a monopoly (Posner 1972; Armstrong and Sappington 2006) is a passive but
invasive form of regulation, since it requires external monitoring to trigger eventual contract termination and
rebidding.
9 An example of how private know-how can be conducive to lowering operating costs was presented by Dalkia
Termika (Vivendi group) to municipalities in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 2000s. The company
offered to upgrade electricity generation and heating infrastructure in return for average historical revenue for
a set period of time. The company’s strategy consisted of reducing variable costs from 75% to 62% by means
of cogeneration technology, and administrative costs from 25% to 20%. Savings of 18% would constitute the
company’s return on investment.
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or private) effort choice to reduce cost. In Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), private agents
select higher effort because they receive the residual profit.
Let’s assume that in a PPP, the private investor requires pjv ≥MC(xjv) and a minimum
ownership and profit share e to transfer know-how, so that from the public agent’s perspective:
MCjv(x) =
{
MC(x) + k if 1− θ ≥ e (lack of know-how)
MC(x) if 1− θ < e (know-how available)
(14)
Thus, private operation leads to lowering of marginal operating cost and public operation
leads to lowering marginal regulating cost. Private operation may also lead to lowering fixed
cost through lower investment outlays and shorter development time (Moszoro 2014). Like-
wise, public operation may lead to lower regulation setup cost. The bundling of investment
and operations in one entity yields inter-temporal efficiency trade-offs: for example, higher
investment outlays may redound to lower operating costs (Iossa and Martimort 2012; Engel,
Fischer, and Galetovic 2001). In this paper, I hold investment outlays constant for public- and
private-sector investors, and focus on the operations of a PPP.10
PPP feasibility requires, hence, θ ∈ [e, 1 − h] to be not empty. I.e., the sum of the
required minimum control rights shares cannot exceed 100%. If the minimum control rights
share required by the private investor e to transfer know-how is larger than the complementary
minimum control rights share of the public administration 1− h to forego external regulation
in exchange for internal regulation, there is no feasible θ. Therefore, the parameter space
θ ∈ [e, 1− h] is the contracting (negotiable) area.11
The private investor will aim for monopoly output and price, and the public agent will
aim for the output at which the price equals average cost.
10 The implications of bundling development and operations for the PPP’s ownership structure and pricing
are discussed in section 6.2.
11 For example, θ in public-private partnerships in water and sewage in Poland ranged between 33% and
64%, implying values of θ ∈ [0.33, 0.64] (Moszoro 2014). Should a private investor have required, say, e ≥ 80%,
that PPP may have not been feasible if the public administration’s required minimum control rights share was
h ≥ 30%.
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4 Comparative Statics of Public-Private Partnership12
The welfare difference between public-private partnership (jv) and private monopoly (m)
yields:
Wjv −Wm =
∫ xjv
0
p(x) dx−
∫ xjv
0
MC(x) dx− (1− α)θ[p(xjv) · xjv − c(xjv)]−
+
∫ xm
0
p(x) dx+
∫ xm
0
MC(x) dx− (1− α)[p(xm) · xm − c(xm)] =
=
∫ xjv
xm
p(x) dx−
∫ xjv
xm
MC(x) dx+
+(1− α){[p(xm) · xm − c(xm)]− θ[p(xjv) · xjv − c(xjv)]}
(15)
Thus, PPP is welfare superior to private monopoly depending on xjv, pjv, α, and θ.
Necessity goods are goods that we cannot live without and will not likely cut back on even
when times are tough. The price elasticity of the demand for most necessity goods provided by
utilities—e.g., water and sewage, electricity, transportation—is low, since there is no adequate
substitution for these goods, so demand responds only slightly to a change in price. Thence,
for price-inelastic demand xjv = xm = x
S ,13
Wjv −Wm = (1− α)[x
S(pm − θ · pjv)− (1− θ)c(x
S)] > 0, (16)
which means that PPP is welfare superior to private monopoly for any α ∈ (0, 1), θ ∈ [e, 1−h],
and pjv ∈ [p
∗, pm).
The welfare difference between public-private partnership and public monopoly yields:
Wjv −Wpu =
∫ xjv
0
p(x) dx−
∫ xjv
0
MC(x) dx− (1− α)θ[p(xjv) · xjv − c(xjv)]−
+
∫ xpu
0
p(x) dx+
∫ xpu
0
[MC(x) + k] dx
=
∫ xjv
xpu
p(x) dx−
∫ xjv
xpu
MC(x) dx− (1− α)θ[p(xjv) · xjv − c(xjv)] + k · xpu
(17)
For price-inelastic demand xjv = xpu = x
S and pjv ∈ [p
∗, pm), Wjv > Wpu if:
(1− α)θpijv < k · x
S , (18)
12 The welfare functions and comparative statics for public monopoly, private monopoly, and regulated
monopoly are presented in the online supplement “Comparative Statics of Organizational Forms of Public
Utilities,” available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2872335.
13 In section 6.3, I relax the assumption on price-inelastic demand.
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such as when part of the profit not included in welfare is lower than the additional cost due to
a lack of know-how.
The welfare difference between public-private partnership and regulated monopoly yields:
Wjv −Wre =
∫ xjv
0
p(x) dx−
∫ xjv
0
MC(x) dx− (1− α)θ[p(xjv) · xjv − c(xjv)]−
+
∫ xre
0
p(x) dx+
∫ xre
0
[MC(x) + g] dx+ (1− α)[p(xre) · xre − c(xre)] =
=
∫ xjv
re
p(x) dx−
∫ xjv
re
MC(x) dx+ g · xre+
+(1− α){[p(xre) · xre − c(xre)]− θ[p(xjv) · xjv − c(xjv)]}
(19)
For price-inelastic demand xjv = xre = x
S , PPP is welfare superior when:
Wjv −Wre = g · x
S + (1− α)
[
xS(pre − θ · pjv)− (1− θ) · c(x
S)
]
> 0 (20)
As pre =MC(x
S), condition (20) can be reduced to:
θ · pjv −MC(x
S) <
g
1− α
−
(1− θ) · c(xS)
xS
pjv −MC(x
S) <
g
1− α
+ (1− θ)
[
pjv −
c(xS)
xS
]
(21)
where pjv − c(x
S)/xS is the PPP unit profit. The higher r and lower θ ∈ [e, 1 − h] are, the
more welfare efficient a PPP will be. For pjv close to MC(x
S), PPP will generate profit
(pjv > c(x
S)/xS) and will be more welfare efficient than regulation.
Figure 1 presents the PPP negotiating area. PU represents the aim of the public agent:
low price downwardly constrained by average cost ppu and public ownership 1− θ above h; PR
represents the aim of the private investor: high price upwardly constrained by monopolistic
price pm and private ownership θ above e. The higher the price above average cost and higher θ
are (towards PR set), the higher the bargaining (monopolistic) power of the private investor is.
Conversely, the closer the price to average cost (towards PU set) is, the higher the bargaining
(regulating) power of the public agent is.
Table 1 presents the results of comparative statics of the four analyzed forms of organiza-
tion of natural monopoly.
Deriving from equations 16, 18, and 21, welfare superiority of PPP requires meeting
simultaneously the following conditions:
(1− α)θ
[
pjv −
c(xS)
xS
]
< k (22)
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Table 1: Comparative statics of economic efficiency of institutional forms of organization of natural monopoly. Results are presented as
conditions for welfare superiority of row A compared to column B (A ≻ B) for price-inelastic quantity (xS), feasible PPP (θjv ∈ [e, 1− h]), and
α ∈ [0, 1].
B
Private monopoly
Public monopoly
Regulated monopoly
A
Public monopoly k < (1− α)
[
pm −
c(xS)
xS
]
Regulated monopoly g < (1− α)
[
pm −MC(x
S)
]
g + (1− α)
[
MC(xS)− c(x
S)
xS
]
< k
Public-Private Partnership pjv < pm (1− α)θ
[
pjv −
c(xS)
xS
]
< k (1− α)
[
θ · pjv −MC(x
S) + (1−θ)·c(x
S)
xS
]
< g
13
p 
1 e 
θ 
0 1 – h 
pm 
1 – θ 
pjv 
PR 
PU 
h
θjv 
ppu 
Figure 1: This figure presents the negotiating area in public-private partnerships. PU represents the
aim set of the public agent: low price downwardly constrained by average cost ppu and public ownership
1 − θ above h; PR represents the aim set of the private investor: high price upwardly constrained by
monopolistic price pm and private ownership θ above e. The private investor requires minimum private
ownership θ ≥ e to transfer know-how; the public agent requires minimum public ownership 1− θ ≥ h
to exercise internal control rights and waive costly regulation. Price cannot exceed monopoly price pm
nor be below variable average cost ppu. The negotiating area is, therefore, bounded by θ ∈ [e, 1 − h]
and pjv ∈ (ppu, pm).
and
(1− α)
[
θ · pjv −MC(x
S) +
(1− θ) · c(xS)
xS
]
< g (23)
Summing equations (22) and (23) yields the necessary condition for efficient PPP:
(1− α)θ[pjv −
c(xS)
xS
] + (1− α)[θ · pjv −MC(x
S) +
(1− θ) · c(xS)
xS
] < k + g
(1− α)
[
2θ · pjv + (1− 2θ)
c(xS)
xS
−MC(xS)
]
< k + g (24)
PPP price pjv is, therefore, bounded by:
pjv <
k+g
1−α − (1− 2θ)
c(xS)
xS
+MC(xS)
2θ
, (25)
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i.e., the maximum price charged by the joint-venture PPP pjv is a function of the marginal
cost MC(xS), the efficiency gains k + g from public-private co-ownership, the weight of profit
in welfare (i.e., the more the public administration values private profit in welfare, the more
it will be prone to efficiency gains from private participation with higher PPP price), and a
markup over average variable cost decreasing in private ownership.
Inequality (25) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for overall PPP welfare superi-
ority. The necessary and sufficient condition is:
(1− α)θ
[
pjv −
c(xS)
xS
]
< min
{
k, g + (1− α)
[
MC(xS)−
c(xS)
xS
]}
, (26)
i.e., the private profit markup over average variable costs that is not part of welfare cannot
exceed the efficiency gains from private management nor the efficiency gains from internal
regulation plus the difference between marginal cost and average variable cost that is not part
of welfare.
Thus, the maximum negotiable pjv is bounded by:
pjv < min


k
(1−α)θ +
c(xS)
xS
,
g
(1−α)θ +
MC(xS)−
c(xS)
xS
θ
+ c(x
S)
xS
(27)
Proposition 1 For α, θ ∈ (0, 1), the maximum feasible pjv(θ) is decreasing and convex in θ.
Proof: For pjv =
k
(1−α)θ +
c(xS)
xS
,
∂pjv
∂θ
= −k
(1−α)θ2
< 0 and
∂2pjv
∂2θ
= 2 k
(1−α)θ3
> 0.
For pjv =
g
(1−α)θ +
MC(xS)−
c(xS)
xS
θ
+ c(x
S)
xS
,
∂pjv
∂θ
= −g
(1−α)θ2
−
MC(xS)−
c(xS)
xS
θ2
< 0 and
∂2pjv
∂2θ
= g
(1−α)θ3
− 2
MC(xS)−
c(xS)
xS
θ3
> 0.
In other words, the more ownership share θ is required by the private investor to contribute
cost-saving know-how, the lower the acceptable maximum price (i.e., private rent extraction).
The downward slope of pjv(θ) depends, ceteris paribus, on k, g, and α: the higher the savings
from private know-how k and internal regulation g are, and the higher the weight of private
profit in welfare α is, the steeper the slope will be. Minimum pjv is bounded by marginal cost,
below which there is no incentive for the private investor to produce. Figure 2 depicts the
PPP negotiating area upper and lower bounded by alternative organization modes and their
welfare outcomes.
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Figure 2: This figure presents the contracting area for efficient public-private partnership. The private
investor requires minimum private ownership θ ≥ e to transfer know-how; the public agent requires
minimum public ownership 1 − θ ≥ h to exercise internal control rights and waive costly regulation.
Price pjv is lower bounded by the best alternative for the private investor (i.e., first-best marginal cost
pricing) and upper bounded by the best alternative for the public agent, either public or regulated
monopoly pricing including k and g. This upper bound decreases in private ownership θ as part of
private profit does not constitute welfare.
When factoring in alternative organization modes and their related costs g and k, the PR
set becomes unattainable for the private investor. As the negotiation area is bounded by the ef-
ficient pjv frontier, the private investor aims to minimize the distance to PR set. This optimiza-
tion problem can be reduced to minimizing the Cartesian distance
√
(pm − pjv)2 + (θ − 1 + h)2,
adjusting pjv and θ. The required minimum public ownership h is not known ex ante, but the
private investor can estimate it during negotiations.
Hitherto, PPP efficiency is subject to saving regulation cost g when θ ≤ 1− h and lack of
know-how cost k when θ ≥ e: i.e., e ≤ 1− h, i.e., discrete functions of private ownership share
in a PPP (see Figure 3, left graph).
Assuming differentiable and monotonic functions g(θ) and k(θ) (see Figure 3, right graph),
the necessary and sufficient conditions for welfare superior PPP can be formulated as the
minimization of g + k:
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Proposition 2 For θjv ∈ (0, 1), PPP is welfare superior if
∂g
∂θjv
+ ∂k
∂θjv
= 0 and ∂
2g
∂θ2jv
+ ∂
2k
∂θ2jv
> 0.
Proof: The proof is straightforward from the discussion above. Also, a contrario, ∀θjv ∈ (0, 1),
if ∂g
∂θjv
+ ∂k
∂θjv
6= 0, or ∂g
∂θjv
+ ∂k
∂θjv
= 0 and ∂
2g
∂θ2jv
+ ∂
2k
∂θ2jv
< 0, then the minimum is located on the
set boundary (i.e., public provision of public goods or full privatization).
1 e 0 1 – h 
h
k 
g 
g, k 
θjv 1 
θ 
0 
g(1) 
1 – θ 
θjv 
g(0) 
g(θ) 
k(θ)+ g(θ) 
k(θ) 
g(θjv) + k(θjv) 
k(1) 
k(0) 
g, k 
Figure 3: This figure presents the regulatory and lack of know-how costs as discrete (left graph) and
continuous (right graph) functions of private ownership share in a public-private partnership. Cost of
lack of know-how k decreases and regulation cost g rises in private ownership θ. PPP is welfare superior
when regulation cost g plus lack of know-how cost k minimum is internal θ ∈ (0, 1). Depicted levels of
g and k are arbitrary for illustrative purposes (e.g., k might be greater than g)
Paraphrasing Ronald Coase (1937), the optimal private ownership share of a utility com-
pany is the share at which marginal regulatory cost equals marginal savings due to private
know-how, where k(1) can be interpreted as the unit X-type inefficiency cost (Leibenstein
1966; Stigler 1976), and g(0) as the unit cost of internal regulation (Balakrishnan and Koza
1993).
5 Policy Implications
Holding financing and development outlays constant, the comparative statics on operational
efficiency yield the following policy implications and testable predictions:
(a) A decrease in the marginal regulation cost (g) shifts the optimal utility ownership organi-
zation mode towards regulated monopoly.
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Jurisdictions with inefficient regulatory institutions may find it best to keep the provi-
sion of public goods in-house. When regulation costs are low (as in the US), regulated
monopoly is an efficient organizational mode for the provision of public goods.
(b) A larger technology gap between the private and public sectors (k) shifts the optimal
utility organization mode towards private and regulated monopoly.
Developing countries, where the technology gap between the private and public sectors is
high, may benefit from transferring the provision of public goods to the private sector.
(c) A faster learning by the public sector (dynamic technology convergence k˙ < 0) increases
the preference for public monopoly.
Whereas the technology and managerial innovations are simple and the public sector learns
quickly, the private delivery of public goods may be limited in time or skipped.
(d) A smaller weight of profit in welfare (α) shifts the optimal utility organization mode to-
wards public monopoly.
For example, by backward induction larger profit expatriation 1− α by international cor-
porations engaged in PPPs lowers the attractiveness of shifting, from the public sector’s
perspective, the provision of public goods to the private sector.
(e) A decrease in the private ownership threshold (e) above which the private investors transfer
cost-saving know-how and a decrease in the public ownership threshold (h) above which
the public agent foregoes costly external regulation increases the probability of PPPs as the
optimal utility organization mode. Jurisdictions with sound minority shareholder rights
(e.g., piggyback rights or “shotgun” clause, which gives you the right to buy or sell—at a
specified price or at fair value—the minority stake to another shareholder if the minority
shareholder cannot resolve an issue regarding the company’s operations or sale) will attract
more investors to PPPs.
Overall, private participation in the provision of public goods through PPPs finds home
in jurisdictions where the technological and managerial gap between the private and public
sectors is large, but requires efficient institutions and strong rule of law to lower regulatory
costs, reduce profit expatriation, and provide protection to minority shareholders.
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6 Extensions and Special Cases
In this section, I relax some assumptions and analyze their impact on the pricing and ownership
structure of public-private partnerships. The aim of this section is to show how the model can
accommodate other trade-offs present in policy analysis.
6.1 Private-Sector Spillovers
Private-sector involvement in public goods provision can induce positive welfare externalities.
For example, municipalities can use new asphalting technologies introduced by a foreign in-
vestor in a toll highway, or efficient water treatment methods used by a PPP can have a positive
impact on crops.
Let’s assume that for each unit of PPP profit pijv, α ∈ [0, 1] contributes directly to welfare
(i.e., 1−α leaves the system) and χ > 0 induces a positive spillover in other industries’ profits,
so that the parameter α can be decomposed into α = α+ χ.
If private-sector profit in public utilities creates spillovers χ that increase efficiency in other
industries so that α > 1 (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1994), conditions (22) and (23) are
always satisfied and the maximum negotiable pjv is not not bounded by welfare considerations
but only by income effects and “political” constraints. In other words, PPPs could support a
higher price pjv without detriment in welfare.
Politicians and policymakers are prone to (ideological) biases regarding the impact of pri-
vate profit in welfare. An underestimation of α would bias θ towards the public sector or
require bigger gains from know-how transfer k and internal regulation g; conversely, an overes-
timation of α would bias the results towards the private sector, creating potential distortions
and corrective interventions in the long-run, including nationalization (or municipalization)
when expectations are not met.
Indigenous (local) private participation in infrastructure is more likely to correspond to
α > 1. On the other hand, foreign direct investment in infrastructure is more likely to be
associated with dividend and expatriation transfers from the PPP to the company parenthood,
thus with α < 1. Most of private investments in PPPs in developing countries come from the
foreign sector, which explains in part why comparable PPPs there tend to show lower pjv and
θ than in developed economies.
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6.2 Bundling
The bundling of investment and operations under one private entity has been pointed out in the
literature as one of the efficiency sources of PPPs over public provision (Iossa and Martimort
2012; Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic 2001). For example, a private toll road operator can invest
in quality materials to lower future maintenance costs or a private water company can invest
in new pipelines to lower licks along the line.
If private ownership leads to lower investment outlays and thus lower fixed cost F (Moszoro
2014), then PPPs that bundle investment and operations create inter-temporal trade-offs that
make them viable—i.e., preferable for both the public agent and the private investor—at a
higher price pjv and higher private ownership θ, or lower know-how advantage k and regulation
savings g, than if the private investor would be assigned operations only.
In other words, if the PPP company bundles operations with efficient investment (i.e., lower
fixed fee), then the efficient frontier in Figure 2 moves upwardly towards PR set for the same
k and g, or remains at the same level for lower k and g.
6.3 Demand Elasticity
Most of goods and services produces by public utilities seem to be price inelastic (i.e., an
increase in price corresponds to a proportionally lower decrease in demand). There may be cases
where the demand for the goods or services provided by the PPP have adequate substitutes and
prices pjv are elastic: e.g., a supplementary told road, municipal extra-curricular recreational
centers for the youth, elderly housing, etc.
If demand is price elastic, an increase in the price charged by the PPP pjv can negatively
affect profit. Both the public administration and the private investor will be prone to keep
prices low or reduce them: to avoid welfare loss and profit loss, correspondingly.
In these instances, the focus of bargaining will shift from price to residual control rights
θ. In other words, price-inelastic demand simplifies the math of the economic analysis, but
convolutes negotiations between the public administration and the private investor over price.
6.4 Quantity–Quality Trade-offs
Generally, regulators set the minimum quality output of public goods ex ante, thus dismiss-
ing possible ex post quantity–quality trades between the utility company and the customers.
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Allowing for quantity–quality trades (e.g., less quantity demand but at a higher quality level)
would yield a different welfare function than equation (4), the outcome of which would be
dependent on the endowment of consumers.
Under quasi-linear preferences on all goods but quality output yields a Coasean-type
endowment-independent univocal quality level (Moszoro 2016). The optimal PPP ownership
and governance structure under different quality–quantity preference function families is a
topic for future research.
6.5 Unmatched Ownership and Profit Sharing
In the analysis hitherto, the parameter θ encapsulated private share in investment and profit—
the so-called “equity public-private joint ventures” or “institutional public-private partner-
ships.” Many PPP structures, however, distinguish between infrastructure ownership on the
one hand, and control rights of operations and profit sharing on the other hand (hereinafter
noted θin and θop, respectively). In practice, the differentiation between ownership and resid-
ual control rights is implemented using dual-class shares (e.g., non-voting or preferred shares)
and investment subsidies (i.e., financial contributions not reflected in the capital structure).
What are the implications of unmatched private infrastructure ownership and control
rights of operations? For θin 6= θop:
(a) If the fixed fee F which covers investment sunk costs is prorated by the share in ownership
θin, the problem simplifies to the analysis of operations hereinbefore.
(b) If θin < θop, the public sector subsidizes the infrastructure. At the boundary when θin =
0 (but still θop ∈ [e, 1 − h]), the public sector owns the infrastructure and leases it to
the private sector to operate it. For example, in many transport PPPs (e.g., toll road
operators), the public sector finances in full the infrastructure, contracts out the operation
of the assets, and takes a share in the profit and/or gets paid a fixed amount.
(c) If θin > θop, the private sector finances the infrastructure, which is then operated by
the public sector. This arrangement is used to develop social public infrastructure (e.g.,
courthouses, schools, etc.) when the public sector is debt-constrained, but the private
sector has better financing capacity.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I focused on the operations of utility companies and modeled regulation cost
and managerial expertise in the provision of public goods as functions of private ownership.
Managerial incentives for cost-saving know-how are subject to sufficient private ownership.
Likewise, provided sufficient public control rights, information asymmetry vanishes, quality is
set and audited internally, and regulation cost is minimized.
Assuming away financing constraints, the optimal private ownership share of a utility
company is the share at which the combined regulatory and lack of know-how cost is minimized.
When the solution is interior, a PPP is efficient in comparison to the corner solutions—public
provision and full privatization. In jurisdictions where regulation costs and private-sector
know-how advantage are high and decreasing co-ownership and co-governance (e.g., in Europe),
PPPs are feasible and potentially efficient. In these cases, PPPs are closer to the first-best
benchmark—i.e., full internalization of know-how and no regulation cost—albeit with a price
higher than marginal cost thanks to rent sharing. The PPP price is upper bounded by the
degree in which private profit is part of social welfare.
In jurisdictions where regulation costs or private-sector know-how advantage are compar-
atively low or decrease slowly in co-ownership and co-governance (e.g., in the US due to high
disclosure standards and low information asymmetry between the public and private sectors),
public provision and full privatization will be the efficient solutions and stable equilibria.
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Appendix A Notation
Variable Formula Meaning
ATC TC(x)/x Average total cost
AV C c(x)/x Average variable cost
c(x) Variable cost of producing x
CS Consumer surplus
F Fixed cost of natural monopoly
e Ownership threshold above which the private investors transfer
cost-saving know-how (i.e., e ≥ θ)
g Marginal regulation cost
h Ownership threshold above which the public agent foregoes
costly external regulation (i.e., h ≥ 1− θ)
k Marginal operating cost increase due to lack of know-how
MC ∂TC(x)/∂x Marginal cost
p Variable part of a two-part tariff
PS Producer surplus
TC(x) Total cost of producing x
x Quantity output of the good produced by the natural
monopoly
Z Lagrangian
α Weight of profit in welfare
χ Weight of profit that increases efficiency in other industries
λ Lagrange multiplier
pijv Public-private partnership profit
pim Private monopoly profit
pipu Public monopoly profit
pire Regulated monopoly profit
θ Private investor’s share in investment and profit
1− θ Public agent’s share in investment and profit
Abbreviation Meaning
jv Joint venture, institutional public-private partnership
PPP Public-Private Partnership
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